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Stochastic modeling of Congress 
 
M.V. Simkin and V.P. Roychowdhury 
Department of Electrical Engineering, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1594 
 
We analyze the dynamics of growth of the number of congressmen supporting the resolution HR1207 to 
audit the Federal Reserve. The plot of the total number of co-sponsors as a function of time is of “Devil’s 
staircase” type. The distribution of the numbers of new co-sponsors joining during a particular day (step 
height) follows a power law. The distribution of the length of intervals between additions of new co-
sponsors (step length) also follows a power law. We use a modification of Bak-Tang-Wiesenfeld 
sandpile model to simulate the dynamics of Congress and obtain a good agreement with the data. 
 
The webpage [1] contains the names of all congressmen, who have co-sponsored the HR1207 
resolution along with the date they co-signed. The plot of the number of co-sponsors as a function of 
date created using this data is shown in Figure 1(a). It is highly irregular with long periods without 
addition of any new co-sponsors interrupted by jumps, when many new co-sponsors join during a 
single day. Such a curve is known in mathematics as the “Devil’s staircase” [2]. The staircase can be 
characterized by the distributions of step lengths and step heights. Figures 2 and 3 show such 
distributions for the staircase of Figure 1(a). The plots look linear in log-log coordinates, which 
suggest that the distributions follow a power law.  
The power law distribution of the numbers of new co-sponsors joining during a day calls into 
mind the Bak-Tang-Wiesenfeld (BTW) sandpile model [3] where a similar power-law distribution of 
avalanches was observed. One may hope that some modification of the model can explain the 
dynamics of Congress. Our model is as follows. There is a network of influence in Congress through 
which representatives exert upon each other political pressure. When political pressure on certain 
congressman reaches a threshold, he co-sponsors the resolution. When a congressman co-sponsors 
the resolution, it exerts political pressure on other congressmen, whom he influences. In addition, 
there are calls on congressmen from their constituency which are analogous to randomly dropping 
grains of sand in the BTW model. The major difference with the BTW model is that a congressman 
cannot “topple” more than once regarding the resolution in question because after he sponsors it, he 
cannot do it again. 
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Figure 1.  (a) Devil’s staircase represents the number of co-sponsors of Ron Paul’s HR1207 resolution to audit the 
Federal Reserve as a function of date. As of November 19 2009, 313 of 435 congressmen co-sponsored the resolution. (b) 
Results of one of the simulations of congressional sandpile model for the same number of days. 
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Figure 2. Rank-frequency distribution of:  (a) the intervals between additions of new co-sponsors (step length); (b) the 
numbers of new co-sponsors joining during a day (step height) 
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Figure 3. Probability density distribution of:  (a) the intervals between additions of new co-sponsors (step length); (b) the 
numbers of new co-sponsors joining during a day (step height)  
In our simulations we used a network where every one of 435 congressmen was influencing k 
randomly selected congressmen and was influenced by k randomly selected congressmen1. The 
“toppling” threshold for each congressman was set to k units of political pressure. The calls from the 
constituency were Poisson distributed with the mean number of daily units of political pressure equal 
to λ. Thus in the process of our simulation for every day a Poisson-distributed random number j is 
generated. Afterward the following procedure is repeated j times. One congressman is selected at 
random out of 435 congressmen to receive a unit of political pressure from a constituent. In the case 
that he reaches the toppling threshold, he co-sponsors the resolution and transfers k units of political 
pressure to k congressmen, which he influences. One or more of those congressmen can reach the 
                                                
1
 We use this simplistic model because of a lack of available data on the influence network among the members of 
Congress. We could investigate a more realistic influence network process given such data. 
threshold, co-sponsor the resolution, and transfer political pressure to those they influence. If a 
congressman, who had already toppled, receives new units of political pressure, they just stay with 
him and have no further effect.   We proceed to topple the congressmen until Congress is in a 
stationary state. At the end of the day, we record the number of new co-sponsors and proceed to the 
next day.  
We tried different values of k  and could obtain a good agreement with the data using 2=k  
and 3=k .   Figure 1(b) shows the staircase produced by one of such simulations 2=k and 7.1=λ  
(the λ  parameter merely rescales the time and thus can be tuned to have the required number of 
congressmen topple during the given number of days) . The plot starts with the day number 7 when 
we got the first toppling and continues for the same number of days (267) as the HR1207 co-
sponsorship data that we have. Figures 2 and 3 show the step length and step height distributions and 
a good agreement between simulations and the actual data is evident. 
We can get some insight into the behavior of our model using analytical methods.  We used a 
random network of influence in our model. For such networks, a mean field theory is exact in the 
limit of infinite network size.  The state of Congress for the case 2=k   is described by just two 
parameters:  the fraction of untoppled congressmen with 0 units ( 0p ) and 1 unit ( 1p ). The fraction of 
toppled congressmen   is determined by these two variables: 
101 pppt −−= .      (1) 
Consider a congressional sandpile of large size L to which M units of political pressure had been 
added. Let us find 0p  and 1p  as functions of the average number of units per congressman LMm = . 
We add a new unit of political pressure. If it falls on a toppled congressman – it has no further effect. 
If it falls on an untoppled 0-unit congressman (this happens with probability 0p ) then  
dmdp −=0 ; dmdp =1 ,       (2) 
where Ldm 1= . If the unit of pressure falls on an untoppled 1-unit congressman (this happens with 
probability 1p ) this congressman topples. He transfers two units of pressure to two other 
congressmen, each of which is in a condition to topple (is untoppled 1-unit) with probability 1p . This 
starts a branching process (see Ref. [4]), and the average number of toppling in the second round 
is 12 p . The average number of topplings n  in the ensuing avalanche is the sum of the numbers in a 
geometric progression with the ratio 12 pr = : ( )1211 pn −= . An average avalanche displaces n2  
units. Obviously, 02 pn of them go to 0-unit congressmen changing them to the 1-unit state. Thus:  
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Correspondingly 1p  increases by the same quantity. In addition, an avalanche topples n 1-unit 
congressmen. Thus:  
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Now we multiply the right hand sides of Equations (2) and (3) by the probability of each event, sum 
them and get:  
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The “analytical” curve in Figure 4(a) was computed using Eq. (1) and numerical solution of Eq. (4) 
with the initial conditions 10 =p  and 01 =p . The “simulation” curve in Figure 4(a) is the same 
simulation as the one shown in Figure 1(b), except the x-axis is rescaled by the factor 4357.1=Lλ  
and the y-axis by the factor 43511 =L . 
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Figure 4. (a) Fraction of toppled congressmen as a function of the number of units of political pressure per congressman.   
(b) Exponential cut-off of the power law of avalanche sizes.  
 
The simulation curve follows the general tendency of the analytical curve, but in addition has a 
staircase structure. The analytical curve does not have steps because in an infinite system, there are 
always avalanches somewhere and the size of each avalanche becomes infinitely small, when divided 
by system’s infinite size. A simulation of a hypothetical sandpile of a hundred thousand congressmen 
produced a curve almost indistinguishable from the analytical curve.  
The distribution of the avalanche sizes depends on the parameter 12 pr = . When it approaches 
1, the system reaches a critical state where the average avalanche size diverges and the distribution of 
sizes becomes a power law. The numerical solution of Eq. (4) shows that 1p  reaches its maximum 
value of 0.37 at 47.0≈m .   This gives us 74.0max =r  which is not very close to the critical value 
1=cr . Why did we still get a power law in avalanche distribution? Let us take the formula for the 
probability distribution, ( )nP , of avalanche sizes, n,  in a random-network BTW model from Chapter 
28 of Ref. [4]. After substituting 2=k and ( ) 1pkp =  in Eq. (28.2) we get: 
( ) ( )( ) 21123 141 nppnnP −∝ . When 1p  is close to its critical value of ½, this equation has the 
asymptotic ( ) ( )an
n
nP −exp1~ 23 , where the exponential cut-off of the power law is 
( )21212 pa −= .     (5) 
For the maximum value  37.01 =p  we get 29=a . Fig. 4(b) shows a as a function of m computed 
using Eq.(5) and numerical solution of Eq. (4). For the period between 34.0≈m and 66.0≈m  (this 
corresponds to two and a half month in Fig. 1) a  stays above 15. This is consistent with the 
maximum step height of 24 in the simulation and the maximum step height of 16 in the actual data 
(see Fig. 2(b)). A power-law fit ( ( ) α−nnP ~ ) to the step height distribution (Figure 3(b)) produces 
1.1≈α  for actual data and 3.1≈α  for the simulation. When we restrict the data range to 2>n  we 
get 4.1≈α  for actual data and 9.1≈α  for the simulation. When there is not a lot of data, the 
estimated values of exponents are not very accurate and different ways of estimating exponents give 
different result. A different estimate obtained using numerical maximization of the likelihood 
function (Eq. (3.5) of Ref. [5]) gives the exponents 7.1≈α  for actual data and 8.1≈α  for 
simulation. This is consistent with the theoretical value 5.1≈α .  The system for a sufficient period is 
close enough to its critical state to produce power-law distributed avalanches.  In contrast, power law 
distribution of step length is not a property of the BTW model in a critical state. The longest steps 
occurred either at the beginning when  1p  was close to zero because most congressmen were in 0-
unit state or after most congressmen toppled and 1p  became small again. We can derive the long step 
length asymptotic from our model. At small m, ( ) mmp ~1 . Consequently the expected step length 
for given m is ( ) ( ) mmpml 1~1 1= . The probability that a randomly selected step corresponds to 
given m is ( ) ( ) mmlmp =1~ . Now ( )lp  can be obtained as 
( ) ( ) 31~ ldl
dm
mplp = .    (6) 
This agrees with the simulation data shown in Fig.2(a), where the fit in the data range 4>l  gives the 
exponent of 2.7. The simulation of a hypothetical sandpile of 100,000 congressmen produced an even 
closer exponent of 3.1. The agreement of the actual experimental data with the theory is worse. The 
fit in the data range 4>l  gives the exponent of 2.3. This means that the theory, perhaps, correctly 
describes the functional form of the step length distribution, but gives a wrong value of the exponent. 
 
  Interestingly, we did not need to introduce any variance in the degree of influence of different 
congressmen to explain the data. In our model all congressmen have the same degree of influence. 
One might have suspected that the biggest steps of the staircase are due to joining of a highly 
influential congressman bringing with himself many new co-sponsors which he had influenced. In 
our model, big steps are a result of evolution of Congress to a sort of critical state, where any 
congressman can trigger an avalanche of co-sponsors. In a related study [6] major properties of 
scientific citation distribution could be explained assuming that all papers are created equal. 
Note, however, that not all resolutions introduced in Congress get the same level of support. 
The difference between resolutions enters our model through public pressure parameter λ.  If it is 
close to zero, the resolution will not get sizable support in reasonable time. An obvious extension to 
the model is to introduce political pressure against the resolution.  We can model it by dropping at 
rate negλ  negative units of pressure in addition to positive units, which we drop at rate posλ . When 
positive pressure far exceeds negative pressure this model will give the same results as the model we 
used with dropping rate set to negpos λλλ −= . An interesting case to investigate will be negpos λλ ≈ . It 
could explain the cases when a resolution quickly gains some support, which, however, never 
becomes overwhelming. 
 
Another possible explanation of the Devil’s staircase was proposed by one of the referees of 
this paper. It may happen because the displays of co-sponsorship are precluded or constrained during 
recesses, holidays, and weekends.  When we look at the data, we see that only five out of 313 co-
sponsorships were announced during recesses, while recesses together with weekends and holidays 
take about half of the time. We simulated the following model. The 313 decisions to co-sponsor were 
randomly uniformly distributed over the time period starting with the date when the resolution was 
announced and ending with the last date for which we had the data. If the decision was taken during a 
recess, it is only announced on the first business day after the recess. Figure 6 shows the results of the 
simulation. It does indeed produce a Devil’s staircase, though a peculiar one: the height of the next 
step is directly proportional to the length of the previous step. The correlation coefficient between the 
height of the step and the number of non-working days directly preceding the date of the step is 0.96. 
This is at odds with the actual data where the similar coefficient is -0.076. In addition, the distribution 
of step height does not match well the real data: the maximum step height produced by the simulation 
is 66 while the actual value is 16.   On the other hand, the simulation produces a step-length 
distribution, which matches better the actual data than the congressional sandpile model. Perhaps, a 
more realistic model which takes into account both the recess constraints and inter-influence between 
congressmen will ideally match the data. This may be the subject of further investigations. 
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Figure 5. Numerical simulation of the model, which takes into account that displays of co-sponsorship is precluded 
during recesses/holidays/weekends but neglects any inter-influence between congressmen. 
References 
1. http://www.ronpaul.com/on-the-issues/audit-the-federal-reserve-hr-1207/ 
2. B. B. Mandelbrot “The fractal geometry of nature” (Freeman, New York, 1983) 
3. P. Bak “How nature works: the science of self-organized criticality” (Copernicus, New York, 1999) 
4. M.V. Simkin and V.P. Roychowdhury “Re-inventing Willis”  Physics Reports (2011),  Volume 502, Pages 
1–35; http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0601192  
5. A. Clauset, C. R. Shalizi, M. E. J. Newman “Power-law distributions in empirical data” 
http://arxiv.org/abs/0706.1062v2 
6. M.V. Simkin and V.P. Roychowdhury “Stochastic modeling of citation slips” Scientometrics(2005) , Volume 
62, No.3, Pages 367-384. Also available at http://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0401529 . 
